The opposition ptw' si" oj rqhv (euj qei' a) / ptwv sei" plav giai, which with time began to express the contrast between the nominative and the oblique cases (casus rectus -casus obliqui) in the grammatical tradition, first appeared in the Greek reflection on language most probably in the circle of the Stoic doctrine, where it was used to determine the meanings of nouns perceived from the point of view of their constituting elements of the predicative-argumentative structures which formed propositions (aj xiwv mata). What justifies this statement is the fact that in the framework of the Stoic dialectics concepts denoted by terms oj rqhv ptw' si" and plav giai ptwv sei" were unambiguously situated in the sphere of the linguistically expressed content (ta; shmainov mena, ta; lektav ) and used consistently in connection with the concept of kathgov rhma ('predicate'), that is the predicative content expressed by the verb. The analysis of the preserved records demonstrates that the term oj rqh; ptw' si" had a meaning of the subjective predicate argument (disregarding the value of the case of the noun which denoted it), whereas ptwv sei" plav giai had the meaning of the non-subjective arguments implied by multi-argument predicates. Therefore, in the Stoic dialectics the opposition oj rqh; ptw' si" / plav giai ptwv sei" reflected the hierarchical differentiation of the status of the content expressed by the nouns perceived as arguments of the predicate within the proposition. These terms gained the meaning of the nominative and the oblique cases, respectively, only in the circle of Hellenistic philologists, whose research and analyses were to a greater extent focused on the formal side of linguistic signs (words). Those scholars used the terminological apparatus of the Stoic school, while introducing there some vital modifications, however. With reference to the issue which interests us here, the modification consisted in the identification of the Stoic oj rqh; ptw' si" with its most frequent language exponent, i.e. the noun in the nominative, and following the same principle, of the Stoic plav giai ptwv sei" with nouns in the oblique cases. The Hellenistic philological school should probably also be ascribed the introduction of the term euj qei' a ptw' si" as a name of the nominative synonymous with oj rqh; ptw' si", as there are no sufficient premises on which to attribute the use of the adjective euj quv " as an index of that case already to Aristotle. 
The distinction between the casus rectus (i.e. nominative) and the oblique cases (i.e. all the remaining ones) is commonly used in traditional and structural linguistics. 1 This distinction was already known to Roman grammarians in Antiquity, the reflex of which is a frequent reference to this division with the help of Latin terms: casus rectus -casus obliqui. In turn, Roman grammar was, as is known, largely secondary with regard to Greek grammar. It is thus not surprising that the Latin attributes rectus and obliquus are calques of Greek words, oj rqov " or euj quv " (lit. 'straight'), and plav gio" (lit. 'oblique, transverse'), respectively, which began to be used in the Greek grammatical tradition to express the aforementioned opposition between the casus rectus (nominative) and the oblique cases.
The use of the terms oj rqov " and euj quv " in the function of determiners of the nominative in the Greek grammatical theory is documented by a well-known Tev cnh grammatikhv , attributed to the Alexandrian grammarian Dionysius Thrax (170-90 BC), which contains the most complete exposition of the Greek word grammar. In the chapter characterising the cases (ptwv sei") as one of the morphological features (parepov mena) of words belonging to the class of names (oj nov mata) we read: D.T. 31, 5-32, 1: Ptwv sei" oj nomav twn eij si; pev nte: oj rqhv , genikhv , dotikhv , aij tiatikhv , klhtikhv . Lev getai de; hJ me; n oj rqh; oj nomastikh; kai; euj qei' a, hJ de; genikh; kthtikhv te kai; patrikhv , hJ de; dotikh; ej pistaltikhv , hJ de; aij tiatikh; † kat j aij tiatikhv n, hJ de; klhtikh; prosagoreutikhv . "There are five cases of the names: oj rqhv , genikhv , dotikhv , aij tiatikhv , klhtikhv . The oj rqhv case is also called oj nomastikhv and euj qei' a, the genikhv case [is also referred to as] kthtikhv and patrikhv , the dotikhv case [is also called] ej pistaltikhv , the aij tiatikhv case † according to aij tiatikhv , whereas klhtikhv [is also referred to as] prosagoreutikhv ."
Although the listed and named ptwv sei" were not characterised more closely or illustrated with any examples here, it is clear that these are indeed grammatical cases. It results not only from the entirety of the later tradition, unambiguously identifying the ptwv sei" mentioned in the above passage with the grammatical cases, 2 but also from the fact that the status of ptwv sei" as inflectional cases corresponds with the status of the remaining parepov mena oj nov mato", which in the text of the Tev cnh identify various other properties of words in this class, including both of their remaining inflectional features, i.e. genders (gev nh) and numbers (aj riqmoiv ). Besides, in this text ptwv sei" were also attributed -as one of the parepov mena -to words belonging to the class of a[ rqron and aj ntwnumiv a (cf. 62, 1 and 5; 64, 1; 67, 3-6) , and the exemplification provided there does not leave any doubts as to their identification with the grammatical cases. 3 For the same reasons it is also beyond doubt that the case named (ptw' si") oj rqhv in the quoted passage is indeed the nominative. 4 Further on in the passage this case was also given two other, secondary, names, of which one is the term (ptw' si") euj qei' a 5 synonymous with (ptw' si") oj rqhv . With regard to the other (i.e. the oblique) cases the term (ptwv sei") plav giai was in fact not used here, however, the functioning of this term as a determiner of the oblique cases in the Greek grammatical tradition is confirmed both by the scholiasts 6 and the treatises of Apollonius Dyscolus. 7 The indicated terms, in fact similarly as the term ptw' si" itself, were, however, used also in philosophical texts dealing with language questions which preceded the formation of the grammatical tradition in the circles of Hellenistic philologists, and it turns out that the terms discussed in these texts had a definitely different meaning. This particularly concerns the Stoics' texts.
The achievements of the Stoics in the field of Greek linguistics are commonly considered to be very significant, however, at the same time identifying views of the representatives of this school on concrete language issues causes huge interpretation problems. This results mainly from the fact that the linguistic conceptions of the Stoics can be studied only second-or third-handedly because, in principle, no texts which would allow for a direct access have been preserved. The major source of knowledge about the subject are The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers by Diogenes Laërtius 8 (D.L.), to a smaller extent the scholia to Tev cnh grammatikhv by Dionysius Thrax as well as other later works, as e.g. Ammonius' commentary 9 to the Hermeneutics by Aristotle. Due to the state of preservation of the Stoic writings it is also impossible to establish what the contribution of particular representatives of this trend to its intellectual output was. It is commonly believed that most of the basic theses and views observed in the Stoic school were formulated by its founder, Zeno of and Chrysippos of , who consolidated and systematised the Stoic doctrine, conveying it in over 700 books.
A major factor which needs to be taken into consideration while interpreting the Stoic linguistic doctrine is the place of linguistic issues in the general framework of the philosophical exposition accepted by the representatives of this school. As Diogenes Laërtius, following the ej pitomhv by Diocles Magnes (1 st c. BC), 10 certifies (7, 39), the Stoics distinguished three basic branches of 3 E.g. 67, 3-4: Ptwv sei" prwtotuv pwn [scil. aj ntwnumiw' n] me; n oj rqh' " ej gwv suv i{ , genikh' " ej mou' spou' ou| , dotikh' " ej moiv soiv oi| , aij tiatikh' " ej mev sev e{ , klhtik' " suv . th c. AD 10 In turn, the source of knowledge about the Stoic study of language was for Diocles most probably the lost treatise Peri; fwnh' " by Diogenes of Babylon (240-150); cf. SVF, III, Diog. Babyl. 21, 22. philosophy, namely, physics, ethics, and logic, and the latter, i.e. logic, was divided into rhetoric and dialectics (D.L. 7, 41) . The scope of the Stoic dialectics was reported by Diogenes Laërtius as follows: D.L. 7, 43-44: Th; n dialektikh; n diairei' sqai ei[ " te to; n peri; tw' n shmainomev nwn kai; th' " fwnh' " tov pon: kai; to; n me; n tw' n shmainomev nwn ei[ " te to; n peri; tw' n fantasiw' n tov pon kai; tw' n ej k touv twn uJ fistamev nwn lektw' n aj xiwmav twn kai; auj totelw' n kai; kathgorhmav twn kai; tw' n oJ moiv wn oj rqw' n kai; uJ ptiv wn kai; genw' n kai ; eij dw' n, oJ moiv w" de; kai; lov gwn kai; trov pwn kai; sullogismw' n kai; tw' n para; th; n fwnh; n kai; ta; prav gmata sofismav twn. [...] Ei\ nai de; th' " dialektikh' " i[ dion tov pon kai; to; n proeirhmev non peri; auj th' " th' " fwnh' ", ej n w| / deiv knutai hJ ej ggrav mmato" fwnh; kai; tiv na ta; tou' lov gou mev rh, kai; peri; soloikismou' kai ; barbarismou' kai; poihmav twn kai; aj mfiboliw' n kai; ej mmelou' " fwnh' " kai; peri ; mousikh' " kai; peri; o{ rwn katav tina" kai; diairev sewn kai; lev xewn.
" There also exists a separate part of dialectics, the one which was mentioned above, namely a part dealing with language alone, within the framework of which the written language and parts of speech are explained; this part is also concerned with solecisms, barbarisms, poetic language, ambiguities, language melodiousness, music as well as, according to some, with definitions, divisions and style."
The presented list of the subjects taken up within dialectics draws attention to the clear separation of the issues concerning that which is signified by language from the issues relating to language as such, and thus the separation of issues connected with the signified aspect of linguistic signs (i.e. with the denoted content) from the issues connected with the signifying aspect (i.e. the linguistic form). This separation is reflected in the division of dialectics into two principal parts (tov poi), of which one treats peri; tw' n shmainomev nwn (of the signified things), the other, on the other hand, peri; th' " fwnh' " (of language alone). We also note that one of the terms analysed by us, i.e. oj rqov ", appears as a determiner of one of the elements constituting the object of studies of the part of dialectics which does not deal with language alone, but with what is signified via language. These elements are the "predicates and the content of the utterances similar to them," out of which some were described precisely as oj rqav ('straight'), others, on the other hand, as u{ ptia ('inverted'). 11 : j En de; tw' / peri; tw' n pragmav twn kai; tw' n shmainomev nwn tov pw/ tev taktai oJ peri; lektw' n kai; auj totelw' n kai; aj xiwmav twn kai; sullogismw' n lov go" kai; oJ peri; ej llipw' n te kai; kathgorhmav twn kai; oj rqw' n kai; uJ ptiv wn. Fasi; de; [to; ] lekto; n ei\ nai to; kata; fantasiv an logikh; n uJ fistav menon. tw' n de; lektw' n ta; me; n lev gousin ei\ nai auj totelh' oiJ Stwikoiv , ta; d j ej lliph' me; n ou\ n ej sti ta; aj napav rtiston e[ conta th; n ej kforav n, oi| on Grav fei: ej pizhtou' men ga; r, «Tiv "_» auj totelh' d j ej sti; ta; aj phrtismev nhn e[ conta th; n ej kforav n, oi| on Grav fei Swkrav th". ej n me; n ou\ n toi' " ej llipev si lektoi' " tev taktai ta; kathgorhv mata, ej n de; toi' " auj totelev si ta; aj xiwv mata kai; oiJ sullogismoi; kai; ta; ej rwthv mata kai; ta; puv smata. "In the part about objects and about what is signified there is situated the study about the content of utterances, both in terms of the complete type, i.e. propositions and syllogisms, and the content of incomplete utterances, i.e. predicates, both the straight and the inverted ones.
The content of the utterance is said to be that which is based on the mental image. The Stoics claim that some content of utterances is complete, other, revealed in an incomplete way, is defective, as e.g. (s/he) writes, since we ask 'Who?.' On the other hand, the complete [content of utterances] is that which is revealed in a complete way, as e.g. Socrates writes. Thus, the group of incomplete content types covers predicates, whereas among the complete ones there are propositions, syllogisms, questions, and inquiries."
The quoted passage demonstrates that the basic term referring to what is signified (ta; shmainov mena), is to; lektov n -'the content of the utterance.' Depending on the degree of its autonomy (completeness) referents of this term are divided into the 'complete content of utterances' (ta; lekta; auj totelh' ), within which one can find propositions (ta; aj xiwv mata), syllogisms (oiJ sullogismoi; ), questions (ta; ej rwthv mata), and inquiries (ta; puv smata), and the 'incomplete content of utterances' (ta; lekta; ej lliph' ), which covers 'straight' (oj rqav ) and 'inverted' (u{ ptia) 'predicates' (ta; kathgorhv mata).
12 The attached exemplification shows that the exponents of the 'incomplete content of utterances' (ta; lekta; ej lliph' ), constituted by 'predicates' (ta; kathgorhv mata), are verbs. And thus the 'predicate' (to; kathgov rhma) is the content expressed by the verb, i.e. the meaning of the verb. In turn, the information concerning the difference between the 'straight predicates' (ta; oj rqa; kathgorhv mata) and the 'inverted predicates' (ta; u{ ptia kathgorhv mata) can be taken from another passage of Diogenes' work: D.L. 7, 64-65 13 : [ Esti de; to; kathgov rhma to; katav tino" aj goreuov menon h] pra' gma suntakto; n periv tino" h] tinw' n, wJ " oiJ peri; j Apollov dwrov n fasin, h] lekto; n ej llipe; " suntakto; n oj rqh' / ptwv sei pro; " aj xiwv mato" gev nesin. tw' n de; kathgorhmav twn ta; mev n ej sti sumbav mata, oi| on to; dia; pev tra" plei' n... ae. kai; ta; mev n ej sti tw' n kathgorhmav twn oj rqav , a} d j u{ ptia, a} d j ouj dev tera. oj rqa; me; n ou\ n ej sti ta; suntassov mena mia' / tw' n plagiv wn ptwv sewn pro; " kathgorhv mato" gev nesin, oi| on j Akouv ei, J Ora/ ' , Dialev getai: u{ ptia d j ej sti; ta; suntassov mena tw' / paqhtikw ' / moriv w/ , oi| on j Akouv omai, J Orw' mai: ouj dev tera d j ej sti; ta; mhdetev rw" e[ conta, oi| on Fronei' . Peripatei' . aj ntipeponqov ta dev ej stin ej n toi' " uJ ptiv oi", a} u{ ptia o[ nta ej nerghv mata [dev ] ej stin, oi| on Keiv retai: ej mperiev cei ga; r eJ auto; n oJ keirov meno". plav giai de; ptwv sei" eij si; genikh; kai ; dotikh; kai; aij tiatikhv .
"The predicate is what is stated about somebody / something, or a thing attributed to one or many objects, as Apollodorus' disciples claim, or else the incomplete content of the utterance which should be linked with oj rqh; ptw' si", in order to create a proposition. Some of the predicates are congruent, e.g. to sail among the rocks… ae. Apart from this, some predicates are straight, others are inverted, still others are neuter. The straight ones are those which combine with one of plav giai ptwv sei" for the sake of creating a [complete] predicate, as e.g. (s/he) hears, (s/he) sees, (s/he) talks. The inverted predicates are those which combine with a passive element, as e.g. I am heard, I am seen. Neuter predicates are those which do not show any of these features, as e.g. (s/he) thinks, (s/he) walks. Among the inverted predicates reflexive ones are those which, while being inverted, constitute actions, e.g. (s/he) gives himself / herself a haircut, as the person cutting his or her own hair gets personally engaged in this activity. Plav giai ptwv sei", in turn, are genikhv , dotikh; and aij tiatikhv ."
Ignoring for a moment the interpretation of the term sumbav mata ('congruent predicates'), which constitutes an element of Diogenes' discussion partly unpreserved due to the text damage in this place, we note that in the above passage, apart from the 'straight' predicates (oj rqav ) and the 'inverted' ones (u{ ptia), known from the passages quoted earlier, there are also distinguished the 'neuter' predicates (ouj dev tera) and the 'reflexive' ones (aj ntipeponqov ta), the latter being a kind of the 'inverted' predicates. Besides, the predicate as such was in one of the definitions quoted above linked with the concept of oj rqh; ptw' si", depicted as an element which, when combined with the predicate, will constitute a proposition. On the other hand, the 'straight' predicate was said to combine with one of plav giai ptwv sei". Thus, the presented definitions demonstrate that the term ptw' si" cannot have the meaning of the grammatical case here as it refers to the linguistically expressed content and not to the form of the linguistic sign (cf. Frede 1978 : 31-32, Long 1971 . Since, on the other hand, the linguistically expressed content constituted by ptwv sei" creates a proposition when combined with a predicate, it can be concluded that the concept of ptw' si" is in this approach very close to the contemporary concept of the predicative argument. j Orqh; ptw' si", as has been mentioned, was characterised as the linguistically expressed content which is necessary for making a proposition in combination with the predicate as such, i.e. irrespective of the kind (variant, type) of this predicate, which in turn leads to a conclusion that this concept needs to be recognised as identical with the logical subject of the predication, the object about which the predicate content is stated, i.e. with the argument of the predicate expressed obligatorily (or connoted contextually) in each proposition.
Ptwv sei" plav giai were, in turn, presented as the linguistically expressed content which is combined with 'straight' predicates. The examples provided (aj kouv ei '(s/he) listens,' oJ ra/ ' '(s/he) sees,' dialev getai '(s/he) talks)' suggest that it concerns multi-argument predicates, i.e. predicates whose exponents are (at least) two-place verbs.
It is, however, easy to notice that, when understood literally, the definition of the 'straight' predicate given in Diogenes' text contradicts the principles of logic, as it states that the 'straight' predicate gets combined with one of plav giai ptwv sei" for the sake of creating a predicate. Thus, it is not difficult to criticise it for the lack of logic which stems from the fact that a certain type of the predicate is characterised as something which, after fulfilling certain conditions, becomes a predicate. In other words, something which only in combination with something else creates a predicate cannot be a predicate itself. However, as a result of its illogical character visible at the level of the wording, the definition suggests that in the system of the Stoic dialectics there additionally must have existed a different type of the linguistically expressed content, i.e. the "defective" predicate, which -in order to become "complete" -requires being supplemented or combined with something else. The presence of this Stoic concept covering the predicative content which is not a full predicate as such is also signalled -outside the quoted passage -in two other places of Diogenes' text. One of them is the already cited passage 7, 43-44, which concerns, among others, "predicates and straight and inverted (content of utterances) similar to them" (kathgorhmav twn kai; tw' n oJ moiv wn oj rqw' n kai; uJ ptiv wn), which allows us to assume that, apart from predicates, the Stoics also identified some types of the utterance content "similar" (o{ moioi) to predicates, and within this group they distinguished exactly between the "straight" (oj rqav ) and the "inverted" (u{ ptia) ones. The other place is paragraph 7, 58. It contains a definition of the verb which is described as a "part of speech denoting a non-complex predicate" (rJ h' ma dev ej sti mev ro" lov gou shmai' non aj suv nqeton kathgov rhma). By attributing the status of a "non-complex predicate" (aj suv nqeton kathgov rhma) to the meaning of the verb this definition implies that in the Stoic dialectics there was too a concept of a "complex predicate," constituted by the meaning of the verb together with some additional element of the linguistically expressed content. Let us add that exactly such a predicative content denoted by verbs which demand a completion is also discussed by kathgorouv menon dev htai prosqhv kh" ptwv sew" oj nov matov " tino" pro; " to; poih' sai aj pov fansin, e[ latton h] kathgov rhma lev getai, wJ " e[ cei to; filei' kai' to; euj noei' , oi| on Plav twn filei' : touv tw/ ga; r prosteqe; n to; tinav , oi| on Div wna, poiei' wJ rismev nhn aj pov fansin th; n Plav twn Div wna filei' . "And then, if what is predicated of the name, 16 requires to be completed with an [oblique] case of some [other] name for the sake of making a proposition, it is called 'less than a predicate,' just as in the case of (s/he) loves and (s/he) favours, e.g. Plato loves; as only after 'whom' is added to it, e.g. Dion, a definite proposition is formed, i.e. Plato loves Dion."
It can thus be seen, also from the exemplification provided, that Porphyrus' 'less than a predicate' (e[ latton h] kathgov rhma) closely corresponds to the 'straight predicate,' identified in passage 7, 64 of The Lives by Diogenes, which constitutes an element of the "complex predicate" or a kind of the linguistically expressed content "similar to the predicate." The element of the content with which the 'straight' predicate must be combined for the sake of creating a complete predicate, defined in passage 7, 64 of Diogenes' text as one of plav giai ptwv sei", must, therefore, be recognised as identical with the concept of an additional argument, implied by multi-argument predicates. This conclusion is confirmed by the exemplification of 'straight predicates' provided by Diogenes, which shows that those predicates imply not only an argument identical with the logical subject of the predication (the theme) -obligatory for predicates as such -i.e. oj rqh; ptw' si" ((ti") aj kouv ei, oJ ra/ ' , dialev getai-'(who) hears, sees, talks'), but also an additional argument, which constitutes with them the predicative content (the rheme) stated about the subject of predication (aj kouv ei, oJ ra/ ' (tina/ti), dialev getai (tini) -'hears, sees (who / what), talks (with whom)'). Thus, it may be assumed that in the Stoic dialectics the term plav giai ptwv sei" denotes the concept of the arguments of a multi-argument predicate which constitute elements of the predicative content (the rheme) stated about the subject of predication, and in this way remains in opposition to the term oj rqhv ptw' si", which denotes the concept of an argument which is the subject of predication (the theme).
In the aforementioned passage from Diogenes Laërtius (7, 64), apart from the 'straight' predicates additionally distinguished were the 'inverted' predicates (u{ ptia), which also included the 'reflexive' ones (aj ntipeponqov ta), as well as the 'neuter' ones (ouj dev tera). The presented characteristics and the examples provided demonstrate that the 'inverted' and the 'reflexive' predicates are estab-16 Porphyrus' claim that something "is predicated about the name" (o[ noma) and "requires to be completed with an [oblique] case of some [other] name" (dev htai prosqhv kh" ptwv sew" oj nov mato"), does not of course strictly reflect the terminology and the conceptual apparatus of the Stoics, as it is not possible to state something about a name, but only about what this name expresses (means). This inaccuracy results from the fact that Porphyrus, who lived already in the 3 rd c. AD, on the one hand uses certain terms in the meanings they acquired in his times, and on the other -similarly to many other later commentators -he ignores the Stoic distinction between the form of the sign and its content. It needs, therefore, to be assumed that the quoted statement conveys a view that something is stated about the content expressed by the noun in the nominative and requires a completion with the content expressed by another noun used in an oblique case.
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10.2478/v10148-010-0012-y lished by the predicative content whose exponents are verbs indicating the passive and the reflexive diathesis, respectively. Thus, these predicates also imply more than one argument, however, they differ from the 'straight' predicates in that the exponents of the latter are verbs indicating an active diathesis. The 'neuter' predicates, in turn, just as the 'straight' predicates, are represented by verbs which indicate an active diathesis, however, they differ from the 'straight' ones in that they imply only one argument, i.e. the subject of the predication (oj rqh; ptw' si"). Such a conclusion results from the definition of the 'neuter' predicates presented in the discussed passage, which defines them as predicates that do not demonstrate any of the predicate features described earlier (ouj dev tera d j ej sti; ta; mhdetev rw" e[ conta), i.e. the features of the 'straight' and the 'inverted' predicates. It means that the 'neuter' predicates neither connote any other argument (plav gia ptw' si") apart from the subject of predication (oj rqh; ptw' si") nor do they combine with the passive element (paqhtiko; n mov rion). On the basis of these characteristics and the examples provided (fronei' '(s/he) thinks,' peripatei' '(s/he) walks)' it may thus be assumed that, contrary to the 'straight' and 'inverted' predicates, the 'neuter' ones constitute complete predicates, i.e. predicates which do not require any completion. A confirmation of this is also provided by passage 7, 43-44, which only talks about the 'straight' and the 'inverted' -but not the 'neuter' -content of utterances "similar to predicates." It proves that the 'neuter' predicates do not constitute a type of the content "similar to predicates," but complete predicates, which stand in opposition to Porphyrus' 'less than predicates' (e[ latton h] kathgov rhma).
With regard to this there appears a question whether it is possible to identify the sense of the terms oj rqh; ptw' si" and plav giai ptwv sei" with the arguments of the predicate, which are denoted by nouns in the nominative and in the oblique cases, respectively. Accepting such a possibility would mean accepting an assumption that within the Stoic doctrine the argument of the subject of predication (oj rqh; ptw' si") is denoted exclusively by the noun in the nominative, whereas arguments which form the predicative content (plav giai ptwv sei"), exclusively by nouns in the oblique cases. The preserved records of the Stoic dialectics, however, seem to prove something different. First of all, we mean here the already quoted text by Ammonius, which reports Porphyrus' exposition about the Stoic systematics of predicates. We read there, among others:
Amm. Comm. 44, 23-45, 7 17 : a] n me; n ou\ n oj nov matov " ti kathgorhqe; n aj pov fansin poih' / , kathgov rhma kai; suv mbama par j auj toi' " aj nomav zetai (shmaiv nei ga; r a[ mfw tauj to; n), wJ " to; peripatei' , oi| on Swkrav th" peripatei' , a] n de; ptwv sew", parasuv mbama, wJ sanei; parakeiv menon tw' / sumbav mati kai; o] n oi| on parakathgov rhma. wJ " e[ cei to; metamev lei, oi| on Swkrav tei metamev lei. to; me; n ga; r metamelei' tai suv mbama ei\ nai, to; de; metamev lei parasuv mbama ouj dunav menon oj nov mati suntacqe; n aj pofav nsin ej rgav sasqai, oi| on Swkrav th" metamev lei (ouj demiv a ga; r tou' to aj pov fansi"), aj ll j ou[ te kliv sin ej pidev xasqai dunav menon, wJ " to; peripatw' , peripatei' ", peripatei' ou[ te summetaschmatisqh' nai toi' " aj riqmoi' ": w{ sper ga; r lev gomen touv tw/ metamev lei ou{ tw" kai; touv toi" metamev lei.
[…] a] n de; to; th' " ptwv sew" kathgorouv menon h\ / to; deov menon eJ tev ra/ suntacqh' nai plagiv a/ ptwv sei pro; " to; poih' sai aj pov fansin, e[ latton h] parasuv mbama lev getai, wJ " e[ cei to; mev lei, oi| on Swkrav tei j Alkibiav dou mev lei.
" name] in order to form a proposition, it is also described as less than a paracongruent, just as is the case of (it) is a care, e.g. in
It is a care to Socrates about Alcibiades."
The passage quoted above indicates that apart from the division of the predicative content denoted by verbs to be 'predicates' and 'less than predicates,' the division which takes into consideration the criterion of completeness of this content or rather its "sufficiency" for forming (together with the subject of predication) a proposition, the Stoics also introduced a distinction between 'congruents' (sumbav mata) and 'paracongruents' (parasumbav mata). The 'congruents' were exemplified by the content given by the verbs peripatei' ('(s/he) walks') and metamelei' tai ('regrets'), whereas the 'paracongruents' were illustrated by the content of the verb metamev lei ('(it) is a regret'). The verb metamev lei is characterised by the fact that it does not open a slot for the nominative form of the noun as an exponent of the subject of predication. This subject is denoted by the nominal phrase in the dative (Swkrav tei metamev lei -'It is a regret to Socrates'), and irrespective of the value of the number and the person taken by it the verb appears only in the third person singular (touv toi" metamev lei -'it is a regret to them,' ej moi; metamev lei -'it is a regret to me'). The terms describing both of the distinguished types of the predicative content, namely suv mbama and parasuv mbama, are linked with the complex verb sumbaiv nein meaning 'come together,' 'join,' 'agree.' The inability of the exponent of parasuv mbama to express the plural and take the values of the 1 st and the 2 nd person, which Porphyrus emphasised, clearly suggests that it is exactly here that the source of the difference between suv mbama and parasuv mbama lies. And thus suv mbama ('a congruent') would be a predicative content which always "agrees" with the subject of predication in terms of the number and the person (Swkrav th" peripatei' -'Socrates walks,' oiJ a[ nqrwpoi peripatou' sin -'people walk,' ej gw; peripatw' -'I walk'), and parasuv mbama ('a paracongruent') a predicative content which in this respect does not agree with the subject of predication, if this one were to express plurality (e.g. touv toi" metamev lei -'it is a regret to them') or if it assumed the value of the 1 st or the 2 nd person (e.g. ej moi; metamev lei -'it is a regret to me,' soi; metamev lei -'it is a regret to you'). The essence of the 'paracongruent' would then lie in the fact that, within the proposition it co-constituted, alongside the predicative content implying e.g. the concept of singularity (metamev lei -'(it) is a regret') there would also appear the subject of the predication implying the concept of plurality (touv toi" -'to them').
As was mentioned earlier, contrary to the verbal exponent of suv mbama, which connotes the exponent of the subject of predication in the nominative, the verbal exponent of parasuv mbama connotes the exponent of the subject of predication in the dative. Porphyrus identifies this subject as ptw' si" (without the determiner oj rqhv ) and contrasts it with o[ noma ('a name') as the subject of predication constituted by suv mbama. Naturally, in this regard Porphyrus' account is not accurate, as according to the assumptions of the Stoic conceptual and terminological apparatus, within which the opposition between the form and the content of linguistic signs is firmly observed, the term o[ noma refers to the form of the sign and not to its meaning. Following the more precise account of Diogenes in this case, the subject of predication constituted by any kind of predicate, and thus also by suv mbama, is oj rqh; ptw' si" (see above, passage 7, 64-65), whose language exponent is o[ noma ('a name'). The inaccuracy of Porphyrus' account may also be indicated by the last part of the analysed passage, in which the 'less than a paracongruent' (e[ latton h] parasuv mbama) was defined as a predicative content stated about ptw' si", which "in order to form a proposition needs to be combined with another ptw' si" plav gia" (to; deov menon eJ tev ra/ suntacqh' nai plagiv a/ ptwv sei pro; " to; poih' sai aj pov fansin)." The inco-nsistency of the record saying that something stated about ptw' si" requires being juxtaposed with another ptw' si" plav gia obviously stems from the fact that, erroneously understanding the Stoics' term ptw' si" as an oblique case, Porphyrus altogether does not take into consideration the Stoic concept of oj rqh; ptw' si" in his account, and therefore the term plav gia ptw' si" used by him has a tautological character. Besides, in the aforementioned passage 7, 64-65 of Diogenes' text 'the congruent' (suv mbama) is not identified with the predicate as such (as is the case in Porphyrus' account: kathgov rhma kai; suv mbama par j auj toi' " aj nomav zetai (shmaiv nei ga; r a[ mfw tauj to; n)), but it is presented as one of the types of predicates (tw' n de; kathgorhmav twn ta; mev n ej sti sumbav mata, oi| on to; dia; pev tra" plei' n…ae -"among predicates some are congruents, e.g. to sail among the rocks… ae"). In this regard it is possible to assume that in the damaged passage of the text the 'paracongruent' (parasuv mbama) was men-tioned 18 as the other type of the predicate, standing in opposition to the 'congruent' (suv mbama). And if the 'paracongruent' (parasuv mbama) is the other type of the predicate, opposite to the 'congruent' (suv mbama), and not some 'quasiparapredicate,' as Porphyrus would have liked it to be (o] n oi| on parakathgov rhma), then the subject of predication constituted by the 'paracongruent,' just as in the case of all other types of predicate, is also oj rqh; ptw' si" ( [ Esti de; to; kathgov rhma […] lekto; n ej llipe; " suntakto; n oj rqh' / ptwv sei pro; " aj xiwv mato" gev nesin -"the predicate is […] the incomplete content of the utterance which should be linked with oj rqh; ptw' in order to create a proposition" -passage 7, 64-65), and not ptw' si", as in Porphyrus' account.
As was pointed out earlier, the exponent of the 'paracongruent' (parasuv mbama) connotes the noun in the oblique case in the function of the exponent of the subject of predication, i.e. in the function of the exponent of the oj rqh; ptw' si" (Swkrav tei metamev lei -'It is a regret to Socrates,' touv toi" metamev lei -'It is a regret to them'). And thus it is not possible to identify the Stoic concept of oj rqh; ptw' si" even with the meaning (predicative argument) denoted by the noun in the nominative, since it covers the meanings (predicative arguments) also denoted by nouns in the oblique cases (e.g. in dative). This concerns arguments of the subject of predication implied by the predicative content classified as 'paracongruents' (parasumbav mata), and also 'less than paracongruents' (e[ latton h] parasumbav mata), which differ from the former in that, for the sake of forming a proposition together with the subject of predication, they must get combined with an additional argument (plav gia ptw' sis"), e.g. Swkrav tei j Alkibiav dou mev lei -'It is a care to Socrates about Alcibiades.' And thus 'the less than paracongruents' are the type of predicative content implying more than one argument, denoted by polyvalent verbs which do not open a place for any argument expression in the nominative.
The statement that the concept of oj rqh; ptw' si" may be connected with the argumentative content denoted not only by the noun in the nominative, but also by the noun in an oblique case, at the same time excludes the identification of the concept of plav giai ptwv sei" with the content expressed by nouns in the oblique cases. The term plav giai ptwv sei" refers to additional (non-subjective) arguments of multi-argument predicates which are, indeed, in most cases expressed by nouns in the oblique cases, however, in the case of the predicative content expressed by such verbs as giv gnetai ('becomes'), also the nonsubjective argument, and thus plav gia ptw' si", is denoted by a noun in the nominative, e.g. Swkrav th" giv gnetai didav skalo" -'Socrates becomes a teacher. ' It may appear that the thesis about the lack of connection between the Stoic concepts of oj rqh; ptw' si" and plav giai ptwv sei" and the category of the gram- 18 The expression: tw' n de; kathgorhmav twn ta; mev n ej sti sumbav mata… ("among predicates some are congruents…") opens the space for another element of the presented systematics, introduced by the operator ta; dev . The types of predicates enumerated further (after the damaged passage) surely represent another division already within sumbav mata (also possibly e[ latton h] sumbav mata). matical case is contradicted by a statement opening passage 7, 65 of the aforementioned text by Diogenes: plav giai de; ptwv sei" eij si; genikh; kai; dotikh; kai; aij tiatikhv . All the terms mentioned here correspond precisely to the names of the oblique cases established in the Greek grammatical tradition, which is attested, among others, by the passage from Tev cnh grammatikhv attributed to Dionysius Thrax, quoted at the very beginning of this paper. However, it needs to be remembered that within the conceptual apparatus of the Stoic school, which precedes the birth of Greek philology and grammar, the terms oj rqh; ptw' si" and plav giai ptwv sei" did not refer to forms of words, 19 but to the content expressed by them, presented as arguments implied by the particular types of predicates. 20 As we attempted to demonstrate earlier, the difference between oj rqh; ptw' si" and plav giai ptwv sei" is not linked directly with the case of the noun denoting a given argument, but with the position (rank) of this argument in the structure of the proposition formed together with it by the predicate. The position of the argument denoted by the term oj rqh; ptw' si" can be identified with the subject of predication, whereas the position of plav giai ptwv sei" with other, non-subjective, arguments implied by the multiargument predicates. Contrary to the subject of predication, the logical status of the non-subjective arguments is diversified, which results from the multiplicity of ways in which they complete the predicates implying them, as the relationships between particular types of predicates and their non-subjective arguments differ. For instance, the relationship between the predicate dialev getai ('(s/he) talks') and its non-subjective argument, i.e. tiniv ('with someone'), is certainly different than the relationship between the predicate oJ ra' ('(s/he) sees') and the argument tiv na ('someone'). It may thus be assumed that distinguishing these different plav giai ptwv sei", attested in passage 65 of Diogenes' text, reflects the aforementioned variation of the logical status of non-subjective arguments of particular predicates, and not (at least directly) the cases of nouns denoting these arguments. This also seems to be indicated by the accepted terminology, which quite clearly refers to the functions performed by particular plav giai ptwv sei" in the structure of the proposition. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the authenticity 20 The fact that oj rqh; ptw' si" and plav giai ptwv sei" represent meanings of nouns perceived as arguments of predicates, and thus that they have a relative character with reference to kathgov rhma, is also indicated in the Stoic characteristics of parts of speech included in the text by Diogenes Laërtius (7, 58), in which koinh; poiov th" (common property) and ij div a poiov th" (individual property), respectively, but not ptwv sei", were indicated as the proper meanings for proshgoriv a (a name) and o[ noma (a proper name). Koinaiv and i[ diai poiov thte" constitute meanings of nouns presented in an absolute way; they gain the status of ptwv sei" in the situation in which they are considered in the context of their relationship to kathgov rhma, together with which they create aj xiv wma (lekto; n auj totelev "), and thus in the situation in which they are presented as components of a more complex content structure. In this respect the semantic value of the words constituting proshgoriv ai and oj nov mata differs from the status of the content denoted by rJ h' ma (the verb), which always has a relative (exocentric) character; hence the verb (rJ h' ma) was defined as a word meaning exactly (aj suv nqeton) kathgov rhma.
of the sentence listing the names of particular plav giai ptwv sei" tends to be questioned; it is believed that this sentence may not come from the text by Diocles (who was a source for Diogenes), but be an interpolation by Diogenes' himself commenting (anachronistically) on the Stoic theory through the prism of the terminological-conceptual net shaped in the post-Alexandrian era (cf. De Mauro 1965: 176, footnote 33) .
And, as it seems, those were the Alexandrian grammarians, who -not showing much understanding for the Stoics' subtle deliberations over the logical status of the referents of linguistic expressions -adapted their terminology, and referred it to the expressions themselves (cf. Frede 1994: 15) . In this way plav giai ptwv sei", as they are most frequently, though not exclusively, denoted by nouns in the oblique cases, were identified with the very oblique cases of nouns as such, similarly as oj rqh; ptw' si" was for the same reasons 21 identified with the nominative. Additionally, this process also resulted in the fact that almost all the texts constituting the sources of knowledge about the Stoic language doctrine, whose origin, as is known, is fairly late, are marked with a specific error which consists in attributing to the terms used by the Stoics the meanings which they obtained in the grammatical tradition. This error is caused mainly by ignoring the Stoic distinction between terms and concepts referring to the field of meanings (ta; shmainov mena) and those which concerned the domain of signs alone (fwnhv ) (cf. Frede 1994: 14) . A typical example of a text marked with such an error is the account by Porphyrus interpreted above. Unfortunately, this error has also crept into many modern studies in which the Stoics are said to have introduced the concept of the grammatical case to grammar (and even the opposition between the nominative and the oblique cases) only because of the presence of the terms oj rqh; ptw' si" and plav giai ptwv sei" in their writings (cf. Pohlenz 1931: 171) .
It is worth adding that the analogous process of transferring the Stoic terminology from the sphere of significatum to the sphere of significans can be observed also in reference to the Stoic concept of oj rqo; n kathgov rhma ('straight predicate'). Let us recall that according to passage 7, 64-65 of Diogenes' text quoted above it was a kind of the predicative content denoted by a verb, which, for the sake of creating a complete predicate, requires to be combined with one of the ptwv sei" plav giai, as e.g. aj kouv ei ('(s/he) hears'), oJ ra/ ' ('(s/he) sees'), dialev getai ('(s/he) talks'). These are therefore multi-argument predicates. The very examples quoted already show that the distinctive feature of predicates of this type cannot be any morphological (inflectional) feature of the verbs denoting them, and especially a particular value of the category of the voice, as apart from verbs in the active voice (aj kouv ei, oJ ra' ) 'the straight predicates' may also be denoted by verbs in the medio-passive voice (dialev getai). Besides, verbs in the active voice may be exponents not only of the 'straight predicates,' but also of the 'neuter' ones (ouj dev tera), as e.g.. fronei' ('(s/he) thinks'), peripatei' ('(s/he) walks'), i.e. one-argument predicates. Meanwhile, in the Hellenistic grammatical tradition the determiner oj rqov " began to be generally used with reference to verbs in the active voice, and thus in reference to the exponents of some part of the Stoic 'straight' and 'neuter ' predicates, 22 except that this determiner was already then linked with rJ h' ma ('the verb') and not with the term kathgov rhma.
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As was mentioned earlier, in order to point to the nominative the Greek grammar also used a synonymous determiner euj quv " alongside with the adjective oj rqov " ('straight') and thus, side by side with the term oj rqh; ptw' si" there existed also the term euj qei' a ptw' si". It is documented by the quoted passage from the Tev cnh grammatikhv and a number of places in the treatises by Apollonius Dyscolos. 24 The sources preserved do not attest the use of the term euj qei' a ptw' si" in the circle of the Stoic linguistic doctrine. The use of the adjective euj quv " in the function of the nominative determiner is, however, often attributed to Aristotle, and in this context passage 31, 181b 35-182a 6 of his On sophistical refutations is cited, since the phrase ouj dotev on th; n lev xin kat j euj quv appearing there is interpreted as a formulation concerning the use of the noun in the nominative. 25 connection with a concrete subject it may have different meanings, of which one is suitable e.g. for the nose, and the other for legs, as in one case it means 'snubness,' and in the other 'bandyness.' However, the expression: 'a snub nose' does not differ in terms of its content from the expression 'a concave nose.' However, it is not possible to recognise it as an expression equivalent to the one which formulates a given concept directly (i.e. in a non-attributive way), as it would be a manifestation of an erroneous deduction. The 'snubness (of the nose)' is not the same as 'a concave nose,' but a sort of a property of such a nose, so it is nothing inappropriate to claim that the snub nose is a nose possessing a concavity which characterises this nose."
The sense of the reasoning presented in this passage may thus be summed up by the statement that the expression 'a snub nose' (rJ i; " simhv ) does not differ from the content of the phrase 'a concave nose' (rJ i; " koiv lh), however, what does differ is the content of the phrase 'snubness (of the nose)' (to; simo; n (rJ inov ")), which was described exactly as lev xi" kat j euj quv . In other words, Aristotle contrasts the phrase 'a snub nose' as an equivalent to the phrase 'a concave nose' with the phrase 'snubness of (the nose)' as non-equivalent to it, describing it as lev xi" kat j euj quv . While characterising the expression 'snubness (of the nose)' and at the same time explaining the grounds for its opposition to the expression 'a snub nose,' the term lev xi" kat j euj quv cannot, therefore, refer to the case in which this expression is used (i.e. nominative), as both elements of the opposition presented here, i.e. to; simo; n (rJ inov ") and rJ i; " simh; , appear in the nominative. Thus, the expression lev xi" kat j euj quv cannot be interpreted as meaning 'the phrase in the nominative,' because the phrase which is contrasted with it (i.e. 'a snub nose' -rJ i; " simh; ), also appears in the nominative. And if it is not about the contrast between the phrase in the nominative and the phrase in the oblique case, the term euj quv cannot be identified with the nominative. This term, as it stems from the context, should, however, rather be interpreted as referring to a word (a noun) which means a particular feature expressing it "directly" (kat j euj quv ) from the logical-semantic point of view, i.e. as a (nominal) designation of this property (to; simo; n 'snubness') -contrary to the word (an adjective) expressing this property "indirectly," that is attributively, i.e. as an attribute of something (simov " 'snub'). It appears then that the term euj qei' a (ptw' si") acquired the technical meaning of the name of the nominative only either among the later disciples of Aristotle, or in the circle of the Alexandrian grammarians, and thus became an expression parallel to the synonymous oj rqh; (ptw' si").
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To sum up, it may be stated that the opposition oj rqhv ptw' si" / plav giai ptwv sei" first appeared in the Greek reflection on language most probably in the circle of the Stoic doctrine, where it constituted an expression of the terminological and conceptual identification of meanings of nouns from the point of view of their constituting elements of predicative-argumentative struc-tures which formed propositions (aj xiwv mata). 27 What justifies this statement is the fact that in the framework of the Stoic dialectics concepts denoted by terms oj rqhv ptw' si" and plav giai ptwv sei" were unambiguously situated in the sphere of the linguistically expressed content (ta; shmainov mena, ta; lektav ) and used consistently in connection with the concept of kathgov rhma ('predicate'), that is the predicative content expressed by the verb. The analysis of the preserved records demonstrates that the term oj rqh; ptw' si" had a meaning of the subjective predicate argument (disregarding the value of the case of the noun which denoted it), whereas ptwv sei" plav giai had the meaning of the non-subjective arguments implied by multi-argument predicates. Therefore, in the Stoic dialectics the opposition oj rqh; ptw' si" / plav giai ptwv sei" reflected a hierarchical differentiation of the status of the content expressed by nouns, perceived as arguments of the predicate within the proposition. These terms gained the meaning of the nominative and the oblique cases, respectively, only in the circle of Hellenistic philologists, whose research and analyses were to a greater extent focused on the formal side of linguistic signs (words). Those scholars used the terminological apparatus of the Stoic school while introducing there some vital modifications, however. With reference to the issue which interests us here, the modification consisted in the identification of the Stoic oj rqh; ptw' si" with its most frequent language exponent, i.e. the noun in the nominative, and following the same principle, of the Stoic plav giai ptwv sei" with nouns in the oblique cases. The Hellenistic philological school should probably also be ascribed the introduction of the term euj qei' a ptw' si" as a name of the nominative synonymous with oj rqh; ptw' si", as there are no sufficient premises on which to attribute the use of the adjective euj quv " as an index of that case already to Aristotle.
Bearing in mind the structuralist model of description of the language syntactic system widely used today, which is based on the concept of predicative--argumentative structures, it is hard to resist the impression that the history of European linguistics has just come a full circle.
